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ABSTRACT 
 
Female Labor Supply and Divorce: New Evidence from Ireland* 
 
If participation in the labor market helps to secure women’s outside options in the case of 
divorce/separation, an increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution may accelerate the 
increase in female labor supply. This simple prediction has been tested in the literature using 
time and/or spatial variation in divorce legislation (e.g., across US states), leading to mixed 
results. In this paper, we suggest testing this hypothesis by exploiting a more radical policy 
change, i.e., the legalization of divorce. In Ireland, the right to divorce was introduced in 
1996, followed by an acceleration of marriage breakdown rates. We use this fundamental 
change in the Irish society as a natural experiment. We follow a difference-in-difference 
approach, using families for whom the dissolution risk is small as a control group. Our results 
suggest that the legalization of divorce contributed to a significant increase in female labor 
supply, mostly at the extensive margin. Results are not driven by selection and are robust to 
several specification checks, including the introduction of household fixed effects and an 
improved match between control and treatment groups using propensity score reweighting. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J12, J22, D10, D13, K36 
  
Keywords: divorce law, natural experiment, labor supply, fixed effects, propensity score 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Olivier Bargain 
UCD 
Newman Building 
Dublin 4 
Ireland 
E-mail: olivier.bargain@ucd.ie   
 
                                                 
* We are grateful to participants at IZA and ESRI seminars for useful advice. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 Introduction
If participation in the labor market helps to secure womens outside options in the case of
divorce/separation, an increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution can be expected
to accelerate the increase in female labor supply. This simple prediction has been tested
in the literature, notably by using cross-sectional variation in divorce laws (eg., across
US states). In this paper, we suggest exploiting an even more radical change, the mere
legalization of divorce, in order to test this hypothesis.
The right to divorce was introduced in Ireland in 1996. We rst show that divorce
legalization was followed by a sharp increase in marital breakdown rates (including both
separations and newly allowed divorces). Then we use this fundamental change in the
Irish society as a natural experiment.1 Following a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, we
focus on the e¤ect of divorce legalization on female labor supply within intact couples. To
account for other possible factors a¤ecting labor supply over the period, we use families
at a "low risk" of marital breakdown as a control group. The separation/divorce risk
is proxied by a measure of religiosity based on church attendance or, alternatively, a
direct estimation of the individual-specic probability of marital breakdown, i.e., a exible
function of individual characteristics and information on religiosity. We use the Living
in Ireland Survey, which spans from 1994 to 2001 and hence provides data pre and post
divorce legalization.
We show that female labor supply signicantly increased as a result of the exogenous
increase in the risk of marital dissolution, and that this response occurred mainly at the
extensive margin. Thus, building outside options seems to depend crucially on keeping
some attachment to the labor market. Results are robust to di¤erent specication checks.
In particular, di¤erences between the treatment and control groups are addressed by
propensity score reweighting. Also, since non-random attrition from the survey may cause
a selection issue, we account for (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity by estimating
a household xed-e¤ects model. Further results show that increased female labor supply
was not compensated by either a decrease in domestic time spent on childcare or an
increase in childrearing by fathers. There is no compelling evidence that male labor
supply has increased with divorce risk. Hence our results suggest that a decrease in
specialization within households did not necessarily occur and that women who secured
their outside options by increasing labor market participation may have done so, at least
in the short-run, at the expense of their leisure time and welfare.
1González and Özcan (2008) use the same reform to examine the impact of the risk of divorce on the
savings behavior of married couples in Ireland.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the literature while sec-
tion 3 presents the institutional background. Section 4 describes the empirical approach,
the data and the denition of the control groups. Section 5 presents the main results and
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
The impact of divorce laws has received a lot of attention. The rst type of question
studied in the literature was how divorce laws a¤ect divorce rates, and notably the impact
of unilateral divorce, which fundamentally changes the nature of the marriage contract
by allowing either party to end it at will. Several authors have exploited time and/or
spatial variation in legislation but evidence is mixed. Peters (1986, 1992), using a cross-
section of data on women, nds no e¤ect. Allen (1992) and Friedberg (1998) obtain the
opposite result using an alternative model specication and panel data recording all the
divorces by state and year respectively. Wolfers (2006) nds only a small long run e¤ect
of unilateral divorce regulations. González and Viitanen (2009) exploit time and cross-
country variations in Europe and nd that unilateral divorce had a sizeable e¤ect on the
divorce rate.
Closer to our concern, the literature has also examined the impact of divorce legis-
lation on household behavior. Precisely, legal reforms leading to "easier divorce" and
subsequent increases in divorce rates are suspected to a¤ect the perceived risk of marital
dissolution and therefore, potentially, household decisions.2 In particular, specialization
within households may have declined and female labor supply increased.3 Previous evi-
2Several important outcomes have received some attention. Unilateral divorce laws have been shown to
decrease domestic violence, spousal homicide, and suicide (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), to a¤ect fertility
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2007) and marriage specic investments (Stevenson, 2007). Divorce also seems to
have long-term adverse e¤ects on children (Gruber 2004, González and Viitanen, 2008). Chiappori et al.
(2002) nd substantial evidence of a change in intrahousehold bargaining associated with a change in the
laws.
3The traditional division of labor between husbands and wives is commonly argued to be an important
gain associated with marriage. Spouses e¢ ciently concentrate on activities in which each of them has a
relative advantage so that family utility is maximized (Becker, 1973). The supposed female comparative
advantage in domestic production is often attributed to the gender gap in market wages and  less
consensually to a productivity advantage in household activities (such as childcare). However, couples
can engage in an e¢ cient degree of specialization only if the relationship is stable and the working
spouse can commit to compensate the partner in charge of domestic production. In e¤ect, moving from
cohabitation to marriage may lead to increased specialization, as shown by El Lahga and Moreau (2007).
Inversely, an increase in the perceived risk of marital breakdown  or the mere possibility to divorce
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dence tends to conrm this hypothesis. Using cross-sectional comparisons, Peters (1986)
and Parkman (1992) suggest that unilateral divorce led to a two percentage point rise in
female labor force participation in the US. These results were argued to be erroneous in
Gray (1998) who found that unilateral divorce laws had very di¤erent e¤ects depending
on the underlying property division laws. Stevenson (2008) revisits the question by taking
a long run perspective and adding important controls that were missing in previous stud-
ies. She nds that women seeking both insurance against divorce and greater bargaining
power within the marriage are more likely to engage in market work when states allow
unilateral divorce, irrespective of the underlying property division laws.
The direction of the relationship between womens work and divorce is ambiguous.
The rise in womens labor force participation is often seen as responsible for increasing
divorce rates (Becker, 1981). However, recent evidence points to the e¤ect emphasized in
the present paper. That is, women may take up a job as a form of insurance in case of
divorce, or in anticipation of divorce. Evidence of anticipatory behavior has been found
in sociological studies (see for instance Poortman, 2005). Recent economic studies also
stress the importance of this e¤ect. Using the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), Johnson and Skinner (1986) showed that, while the e¤ect of wiveslabor market
participation on the divorce risk is insignicant, a rising probability of divorce faced
by married women increases their labor supply, whether they ultimately separate or not.
They estimate that up to one-third of the unexplained increase in female labor market
participation in the U.S. between 19601980, a period during which divorce rates doubled,
may be attributed to this e¤ect. Lundberg and Rose (1999) also used the PSID and found
that a higher divorce risk is associated with decreased specialization. Gray (1995) found
that womens labor force participation increased two to three years prior to divorce.4
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ect of an arguably stronger shock to the risk of divorce
makes intertemporal commitment more problematic and is likely to reduce the level of specialization
within marriage. Indeed, spouses who specialize in home production may be disadvantaged in the case
of a divorce compared with their partners, and may want to secure their outside options by increasing
labor market participation (see Lundberg, 2002, for an enlightening discussion).
4Further evidence is provided by alternative methodologies. Papps (2006) calculated divorce proba-
bility using a Cox proportional hazard model and data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 and found that married women work more when they face a higher probability of divorce. Using
aggregated time series data, Bremmer and Kesselring (2004) found that an increase in the divorce rate
results in a long-run increase in the participation rate. Note also that Sen (2000) found di¤erent patterns
for older and younger cohorts. In the former, women who foresaw a high probability of divorce were likely
to work more than their low divorce-risk counterparts; in the latter, labor supply patterns for high and
low divorce-risk women were relatively similar.
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than the introduction of unilateral divorce: the legalization of divorce in a setting where
it was previously banned. We show that the legalization was followed by higher rates
of marital breakdown, and exploit the heterogeneity in the risk of divorce across the
population to analyze the e¤ect of the reform on the labor supply of married women. We
also consider the e¤ect on mens labor supply, which has received less attention and for
which the existing evidence is mixed. Among these studies, Kapan (2008) nds no change
in husbandslabor supply in response to changes in the divorce law in the UK. Chiappori
et al. (2002) argue that men would increase their labor supply only if the laws favor them,
while Mueller (2005) nds an increase in the work hours of Canadian men in anticipation
of divorce.
3 Institutional Background
The Republic of Ireland was one of the last Western countries not to have any legal
provision for divorce, the Irish Constitution of 1937 having put a ban on the dissolution
of marriage. A referendum on the subject took place in 1986 in which two-third of the
electorate rejected a change in the law. In the wake of the referendum, however, legal
separation was introduced;5 by 1995, 75,000 Irish couples had become legally separated.
On 25 November 1995, the question was again put to the Irish electorate. At the beginning
of the referendum campaign opinion polls suggested that there would be a clear, if not
comfortable, majority in favor of divorce. The margin declined as polling day approached
and in the last month before the referendum, the Irish Government placed advertisements
in favor of a yes vote in a large number of national and regional newspapers. The result
was a very narrow majority (50:28 percent) in favor of the legislation of divorce. The
turnout of eligible voters was 61:9 per cent compared to 59:6 per cent in the June 1986
referendum on the same issue. The narrowness of the 1995 vote necessitated a recount
(Irish Times, 1995). Based on these facts, we argue that the result of the referendum
was largely unexpected and that the introduction of divorce was unanticipated prior to
November 1995.
The removal of the ban was incorporated into the Constitution in June 1996, and the
new divorce law became e¤ective in February 1997. Divorce in Ireland is not unilateral,
i.e., even if the separation requirement is met a divorce is not automatically granted if
one of the partners is opposed. The economic consequences of divorce for the spouses
are broadly at the discretion of the courts. The law states the factors to be taken into
5Judicial separation was possible since 1989. An application can be made in case of adultery or if the
spouses have lived apart or have not had a normal marital relationship for at least one year.
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consideration, including the contributions made by the two spouses (both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary), but there is no explicit policy of equal division of assets. The calculation
of actual maintenance payments is up for the courts to decide and is based on the nancial
resources and needs of the spouses.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of divorces and judicial sep-
arations since the late 1980s according to Census data. Obviously the number of divorces
granted rose sharply immediately after it came in to law in 1997. This could simply be
a reection of a backlogbeing cleared, i.e., separated couples who wished to divorce
prior to 1996 were now availing of divorce as it became legally possible. Nonetheless, the
number of separated persons did not decrease even if it progressed less rapidly in the
second half of the 1990s than in the rst half, as some substitution with divorce may
have occurred. The important aspect for our purpose is that the legalization of divorce
increased the overall rate of marital dissolution (divorces, separations and remarriages).6
Figure 1 (top panel) conrms that the stock of broken marriages rose sharply from around
40,000 in 1986 to 200,000 twenty years later, and that the progression is much more rapid
following the legalization of divorce.7 We show in what follows that these average gures
hide contrasted patterns for di¤erent subgroups of the population.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Approach
The possibility of divorce and a rising rate of marital breakdown may encourage married
women to increase their labor market participation and strengthen their outside options.
We test this simple prediction using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. Denote Yi the
outcome of interest for household i, and Xi a vector of controls. The sample comprises
of married couples observed in the pre-divorce period (Posti = 0) as well as following the
introduction of divorce (Posti = 1). The variable Treati denotes the intensity of treatment
6It is noticeable that the number of separations had already started to increase prior to divorce
legalization. Several authors discuss how the rise in divorce rates can occur before the introduction of
new divorce laws due to a prior change in social norms (Fella et al., 2004, Allen, 1998, Hiller and Recoules,
2009).
7The number of married people is also rising over the period but not to the extent as to negate
the increase in marital breakdown. According to Census information, a ratio of 14:1 married people to
separated/divorced people existed in 1996. This ratio had dropped to 9:1 by 2002 and fell again to 8:1
by 2006. Note also that the legalization of divorce did not absorb previous marriage annulments (the
annulment rate remained very small, around the 1% mark, over the whole period under consideration).
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for household i, i.e., the degree of exposure to an increased risk of marital breakdown.
As discussed in detail below, it is proxied by either the degree of non-religiosity or a
direct, individual-level estimation of the probability of separation/divorce. When using
religiosity as a binary variable, with Treat = 0 for a religious household (control group)
and 1 otherwise (treatment group), the estimation goes as follows:
Yi = Posti + Treati + Posti  Treati + Xi + Posti Xi + i: (1)
In the case of a binary treatment, the interpretation is standard. That is,  captures the
time trend, i.e., the average di¤erence in outcome Yi between the pre- and post-treatment
periods, as identied on the non-treated;  captures the average di¤erence in outcome
between the treated and the non-treated;  is the coe¢ cient of interest, i.e., the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence estimator. Covariates X may improve the precision of the model but also
control for the di¤erences in observables between treated and control groups. Note that the
treatment e¤ect  may be (wrongly) driven by di¤ering trends in observables between the
treated and control groups as captured by the Treati variable. We purge the estimation
of this e¤ect by introducing interactions between the Post variable and the controls X.8
The main outcome Yi is married womens labor supply as a continuous variable, i.e.,
their weekly work hours, so that model (1) can be estimated by OLS. We consider two
cases, with or without zeros, in order to verify if divorce had an e¤ect at both the extensive
and the intensive margin. Also, the participation decision can be estimated by a linear
probability model, to ease the interpretation of the coe¢ cients in di¤erence-in-di¤erence
analyses, or by a logit model in which (1) represents the propensity to participate in the
labor market. We also consider male labor supply in the last section, as well as time
spent on childcare by both husbands and wives. Below, we present the data and discuss
in detail two essential dimensions that may crucially a¤ect the results: the denition of
the pre and post-treatment periods and the choice of the control group.
4.2 Data
Our core results are based on samples drawn from the Living in Ireland Survey (LII). This
is a longitudinal survey that was conducted on an annual basis between 1994 and 2001.
It is based on a representative sample of the Irish population and contains information
8At this stage, we ignore the panel dimension and cluster standard errors at the individual level when
estimating model (1) on data pooled over a number of years (see section 4.2). Accounting for selection
on observables only and doing so in a linear way may not be enough. To improve on both accounts, we
shall also allow for (time-invariant) unobservables using panel information and perform propensity score
reweighting (see section 5.2).
6
on demographics, work duration, social situation, living standards and nancial circum-
stances of Irish families. The original sample consisted of just over 4; 000 households
and nearly 15; 000 individuals per year. For the main di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimations,
we use (separately) the subsamples of married women and married men. Since the le-
galization of divorce may well a¤ect the incentives to marry, we exclude couples whose
marriages took place in 1996 or later in order to avoid potential selection into marriage
e¤ects (30 observations). Since retirement decisions may interfere with the labor supply
response that we aim to capture, we exclude couples above 60 (26% of the initial sample).
Additionally, we use a sample of separated/divorced individuals together with married
people to estimate the probability of divorce, as explained below. We also use the Irish
Household Budget Survey (HBS) for one of our robustness checks. The HBS is carried out
at ve-year intervals and contains information on household income sources and expen-
diture as well as demographic and socio-economic variables. The sample size is around
8; 000 households for each wave and the most recent data available are for the years 1987,
1994, 1999 and 2005.
4.3 Sensitivity to Timing
The denition of pre- and post-treatment periods may crucially a¤ect the results and
necessitates an extensive sensitivity check. For the main di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis
using the LII, we pool years 1994 and 1995 (until referendum day, the 25th of November
1995) to obtain the pre-divorce group. We make use of di¤erent post-divorce introduction
periods. Once people knew that divorce was going to be introduced presently, they might
have adjusted their behavior there and then. Hence the rst "post" group is simply
obtained by pooling observations from voting day until 2001. Since the rst Irish divorce
was passed in 1997 with substantial media coverage we use the period 1997-2001 as
an alternative "post" group. As one may argue that it took time for the increased rate of
divorce/separation to a¤ect the perceived risk of marital breakdown, we also use a later
period 1998-2001.
We also provide a "check" di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation based on pre- and post-
periods which do not surround the legalization of divorce, namely 1998-99 and 2000-01.
This can be seen as a placebotest, the aim of which is to verify whether the approach
may be picking up a general trend rather than the e¤ect of divorce introduction.
A specic issue is related to the fact that 1; 515 households were added to the survey
in 2000 because of some attrition over the life of the survey and to ensure that a repre-
sentative sample was maintained. There may be bias in the original sample because of
attrition, but the refreshment sample may also cause bias because of possible di¤erences
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from the original sample. The xed e¤ects estimation presented below is a partial check
on that issue. We also present results both with and without the refreshment sample for
years 2000-2001.
Finally, when using the HBS, we simply choose the two available waves which most
closely surround divorce legalization (1994 and 1999) and compare with LII estimations
based on the very same years.
4.4 Control Groups
We suggest control groups that are subject to similar economic conditions as the treated
but did not experience, or were much less a¤ected by, the increase in the perceived risk of
divorce following the law change. Firstly, we identify the risk of marital dissolution using
the degree of religiosity (see also González and Özcan, 2008). We then carry out a direct,
individual-level estimation of the risk of marital breakdown using the LII survey and a
number of covariates.9
Religiosity
While most European countries had a legislative basis for divorce from the rst half of
the 20th century, three countries had a ban on divorce in place until relatively recently:
Italy (divorce was legalized in 1970), Spain (1981) and Ireland (1996). These three coun-
tries are also predominantly Roman Catholic.10 Since divorce is banned by the Catholic
Church, it is plausible to think that religious couples would be less responsive to the legal-
ization of divorce. Our rst treatment variable therefore relies on proxies for the degree
of (non-)religiosity.
Studies on the economics of religion typically use church attendance as a measure of
religiosity at the individual level when self-reported religiosity is not available, as it is the
case in our data (Iannaccone, 1998). In the LII survey, respondents are asked Apart from
weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services?.
9Note that we refrain from using single individuals as a control group for several reasons. Firstly, there
is possibly an important lack of "common support" between the two groups (especially with respect to
age). Also, the labor supply behavior of singles is fundamentally di¤erent from the joint decision of
partners in a couple. In our data, labor supply patterns of the two groups are very di¤erent, not only in
level but also in trend. Finally, even though evidence for Ireland does not point to a radical change in
the marriage rate, the decision to marry is potentially a¤ected by the legalization of divorce (since there
is a change in the value of marriage).
10In Ireland, out of 21; 355 marriages in 2005, 74:3% were celebrated as a Catholic marriage, 3:4%
under other religious denominations (93% of which were Church of Ireland or Presbyterian) and 22:3%
as civil marriages.
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The response takes a value of between 1 (attends religious services more than once a
week) and 7 (never attends religious services).11 For the main results, we use the answer
either as a continuous variable (Treat is increasing with the degree of non-religiosity) or
as binary, where the control group (Treat = 0) is composed of households where the wife
attends church at least once a week. This threshold is found to be the relevant one as
discussed in the estimations of the risk of marital breakdown below.
As in González and Özcan (2008), we believe that this is a robust control group for the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation. Firstly, and most importantly, there is clear evidence
that "religious women", so dened, do have a much lower rate of marital dissolution
(around 4 times less than non-religious couples prior to divorce legalization and around
6 times less by the end of the 1990s). This can be seen in the lower panel of Figure 1
where we plot the rates of separation and marital breakdown (separations plus divorces)
for religious and non-religious households. We also point to the fact that religious couples
were not a¤ected by the new law: the rate of separation remains constant and the number
of actual divorces is marginal. Secondly, we do not believe that church attendance reects
only a compliance with social norms in such a religious country as Ireland. The 2002
European Social Survey asks about both church attendance and self-reported religiosity
(on a scale from 0 to 10). Around 89% of those who attend church at least once a week
also report to be religious or very religious (values 5-10), versus 34% for those who attend
less than once a week.12 Finally, church attendance typically occurs at times where it
does not interfere with work choices (Saturday evenings, Sunday mornings), and hence
should not conict with our estimates of female labor supply.
Nonetheless, it is important to check for potential di¤erences between religious and
non-religious women. This is taken care of by the inclusion of Xi and Posti  Xi inter-
actions terms in the regression. Moreover, we focus on married couples and may have
to account also for spousesreligiosity. Clearly, the main treatment, as dened above,
uses own religiosity, i.e., we use the church attendance of the wives (husbands) in the
regressions on female (male) labor supply/participation. Yet we have also experimented
with alternative measures based on both spouseschurch attendance (e.g., Treat = 0 if
both attend at least once a week) or constructed as a religiosity "score" based on both
spousesanswers, as explained in the sub-section on robustness checks.
In addition, we use another question from the LII survey concerning condence in the
11There is very little variation in reported church attendance over time but we nonetheless x the
response to this question equal to the response given the rst time the individual appears in the survey.
12Inversely, among those who report to be very religious (values 8, 9 or 10), 82% also report attending
church at least once a week.
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church (answers are 1-great deal, 2-quite a lot, 3-not very much and 4-none at all) and the
amount of donations to the church reported in the HBS (and calculated as a proportion
of household total disposable income). Contrary to the question on church attendance,
it is di¢ cult to decide on a cut-o¤ to create a binary treatment, so we simply use the
level of donation as a continuous proxy for religiosity. Only for the purpose of reporting
descriptive statistics (see below) do we create a binary variable where religious households
are dened as those with positive amounts of donation to the church.
Risk of Marital Breakdown
The control groups previously dened require some assumptions, for instance the
choice of a threshold for the binary variable, the cardinality assumption when using re-
ligiosity in a continuous way or the denition of particular scores. Alternatively, we can
estimate and predict directly the individual probability of marital breakdown using church
attendance and other controls, then use it as a continuous variable for the risk of marital
dissolution (Treat) in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation. This way, we "let the data
speak" about the inuence of the di¤erent church attendance levels on the propensity of
marital breakdown. To do so, we run a probit regression on the sample of all women
(married, separated or divorced) where the dependent variable takes a value of one if a
woman is separated/divorced.
Estimates and marginal e¤ects are reported in Table 1. The rst specication includes
a single dummy for religiosity and shows that attending church at least once a week
is associated with a smaller risk of being divorced/separated. The magnitude ( 4:2
percentage points) reduces the probability of being divorced/separated to almost zero
compared to the average predicted probability for married women. The second estimation
uses the complete set of dummies for the di¤erent answers to the church attendance
question and is used to predict divorce probability for married women hereafter. Results
with this exible specication show that church attendance less than once a week increases
signicantly the probability of marital breakdown ("more than once a week" is the omitted
category and the coe¢ cient for "once a week" is not signicant). This lends support to
our choice of "at least once a week" as the relevant cuto¤ for the binary treatment variable
previously dened.13
13Other controls show that age has an inversed U-shape e¤ect on the risk of divorce/separation while
the presence of young children and the number of children decrease it. Urban dwellers, those with low
educational levels or with university degrees are more at risk. A third specication (not reported) includes
political views but does not improve the t much. It only shows that those close to the WorkersParty
are also more at risk. A limitation of these estimations is that for those who are divorced or separated,
information on their previous marriage is not available. That is, we cannot use information on their former
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4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the estimation results, we report the descriptive statistics of our sample
of married women in Table 2. We rst describe our full LII sample, then present statistics
for both LII and HBS for the only two years available in the HBS (1994 and 1999).
We distinguish between religious and non-religious couples using the church attendance
denition (at least once a week) for the LII, and using positive donations for the HBS.
Interestingly, the two denitions give relatively similar proportions of religious families
(76% and 72% in LII and HBS respectively, for the pre-divorce legalization period). Note
that the proportion of religious persons is larger than the proportion of voters against
divorce legalization, but religious people may well accept that others need to divorce.
Not surprisingly, both LII and HBS datasets show that religious couples are older, with
less children (perhaps due to the di¤erence in age structure), more highly concentrated
in rural areas and have less university degree qualications. The most likely reason for
these di¤erences is a cohort e¤ect. Table 2 shows that religious women work less than
non-religious ones in general. Again, this may reect the slightly older makeup of religious
women. Importantly, our estimations control for characteristics such as age and education
in Xi and PostXi terms. In section 5.2, we control more specically for the (observed)
di¤erences between treatment and control groups using propensity score reweighting. No-
tice that both religious and non-religious women increased their labor supply over the
time period in question, which translates secular trend in increased participation and the
more specic context of the "celtic tiger" economic upturn. The important observation is
that non-religious women have increased their participation by a greater extent, i.e., we
nd a crude e¤ect of around 5 points when using the whole LII sample to compare pre-
and post-divorce legalization (see table Table 2). This can be visualized clearly in Figure
2, where the time trends in female labor market participation is depicted by religiosity
group. Both groups show an increasing trend but the rise is more rapid for non-religious
women. This is very suggestive of a positive e¤ect of divorce legalization on the partic-
ipation rate of women a¤ected by the increased risk of marital breakdown. The rest of
the paper aims to move beyond these average trends (and crude di¤erence-in-di¤erence
measures) by controlling for individuals characteristics.
husband (e.g., their religiosity, the age gap, etc.) or marriage (age at marriage, length of marriage, etc.).
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5 Results
5.1 Main Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimations
We rstly present our di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimations based on the LII survey and for
the three main treatment variables as explained above: (1) a binary variable taking a
value of 1 if the wife attends church at least once a week, (2) the continuous religiosity
variable based on the wifes church attendance and (3) the continuous risk of separation as
predicted using the LII data. Several other treatment options have also been experimented
with and are discussed below. The alternative pre- and post-divorce introduction periods
and the di¤erent outcomes are those dened in the previous section. In the various tables
described below, we simply report the coe¢ cient on the Post  Treat variable, i.e., the
average treatment e¤ect on the treated.14 The sign and signicance of this coe¢ cient
 is indeed the relevant information for all the models at use, including the probit of
participation.15
Table 3 shows that coe¢ cients are all signicant for the participation model and for
labor supply (work hours including zeros), for the four alternative "post" periods and
the three main treatment variables. None of the estimates are signicant for work hours
excluding zeros. This indicates that the response to the introduction of divorce occurred at
the extensive margin. That is, for those married women who already worked, there seem
to be no signicant response to the legalization of divorce. This provides an interesting
insight into the bargaining mechanisms possibly at work within married couples. Precisely,
what seems to matter for women who want to build up outside options is to keep some
attachment to the labor market rather than to increase hours of work. Having a job,
whether it is part- or full-time, may be enough to maintain human capital levels, access
to a social network, access to a potential remarriage market, etc. Other studies, and in
particular Johnson and Skinner (1988), conrm that womens increase in labor supply in
14The set of estimation tables for all the scenarios (di¤erent treatment denitions, pre and post periods
denitions and outcomes) is not included due to lack of space but is available from the authors. Results
are relatively standard concerning the determinants of female labor supply: the presence of young children
and the number of children decrease female participation, as does the level of household income other
than female labor income (capital income and husbands earnings); participation increases with education
levels and varies with age according to an inverted U-shape. The R2 (for OLS estimations) and pseudo-
R2 (for logit estimations) are at conventional levels for the work hour equation (including zeros) and the
participation model, but small for the estimation of work hours excluding zeros.
15Concerns about the interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear models have been raised by Ai
and Norton (2003). However, Puhani (2008) demonstrates that these concerns are not relevant for the
treatment e¤ect in non-linear di¤erence-in-di¤erence models.
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anticipation of divorce is mostly on account of an increase in participation rather than in
work hours.
Several checks have been performed. We nd that excluding the PostXi interaction
terms does not a¤ect the estimates much (not reported). Also, omitting the refreshment
sample (896 observations, 9% of our total sample) does not change the results fundamen-
tally when 1997-2001 is used as the "post" period (see fourth rows in panels of table 3).
Finally, it is reassuring to see that the coe¢ cients obtained with our placebo test, i.e.,
when the "pre" and "post" periods follow the divorce introduction, are not signicant
(see fth and sixth rows in panels of table 3). This conveys that the e¤ect is not due to
general di¤erences in labor supply trends between religious and non-religious women.
We now look at the magnitude of the e¤ect, rst considering the participation model
with treatment 1 (the binary variable for religiosity). When using a linear probability
model, the e¤ect is directly given by coe¢ cient  (top left panel of table 3, rst row),
ranging within a narrow :07 :08 interval over the di¤erent "post" scenarios. We have also
calculated the marginal (rather, incremental) e¤ect when using a logit for participation
(top right panel of table 3). In that case, the treatment e¤ect is slightly larger, around :10,
but does not vary signicantly between the di¤erent timing scenarios.16 This means that,
following the legalization of divorce, the participation rate of non-religious married women
increased by around 10 percentage points, relative to religious married women. Expressed
as a proportion of the average participation rate of non-religious women prior to divorce
introduction (40%), this points to a 25% increase. Remaining with treatment 1, the
coe¢ cient for the work-hour model (including zeros) shows that post divorce introduction,
the work duration of non-religious married women increased by around 2:2   2:7 hours
per week relative to religious married women (see bottom left panel of table 3). Using
treatment 3, we obtain coe¢ cients of around 25 in the case of work hours (incl. zeros).
Dividing these coe¢ cients by 100 gives an intuitive interpretation: a one percent increase
in the risk of marital breakdown leads to an increase in labor supply of around 0:25 hours
per week. It also leads to an increase in participation of around 1:1 point according to the
logit model (top right panel of table 3) and :8 point according to the linear probability
model (not reported).
16As said above, the concern raised by Ai and Nortn (2003) does not apply here, and this e¤ect can
be calculated simply as the incremental e¤ect of the coe¢ cient  of the interaction term in the logit
estimation (see Puhani, 2008).
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5.2 Robustness Checks and Additional Results
The results described in the previous sub-section convey that female labor supply amongst
groups at a higher risk of divorce has signicantly increased following the legalization of
divorce in Ireland. We now suggest several robustness checks and additional results.
Propensity Score Reweighting
Descriptive statistics (Table 2) have shown that religious and non-religious women have
relatively di¤erent characteristics, likely indicative of a cohort e¤ect. We have accounted
in a linear way for observed di¤erences in X, and how these characteristics a¤ect labor
supply in the post-divorce introduction period. It is possible, however, to use matching
techniques to relax the linearity assumption and to check (or impose) common support.
In the case where the treatment variable is binary (treatment 1 in our previous results),
a simple approach consists in estimating the propensity of being treated and using the
inverse propensity score to reweight the data. Denoting bi = bP (Treati = 1) as the
estimated probability of treatment for observation i, we use the weights suggested by
Firpo (2007) in a more general (non-linear) framework, that is 1=(1   bi) and 1=bi for
non-treated and treated observations respectively.17
According to Table 4, results are relatively robust to this sensitivity check in terms of
signicance. The inclusion of the Xi and Post Xi interaction terms in our regressions
was already quite successful in controlling for di¤erences in characteristics between the
treated and control groups. Yet we can observe that coe¢ cients of the participation
logit are slightly larger when reweighting is used, and so are the standard errors. The
coe¢ cients of the linear model in hours (including zeros) increase by around a third (a
half for the rst timing scenario).
Selection and Fixed E¤ects Model
A potential bias in the preceding results stems from the fact that we focus on married
couples. Yet it is possible that the stock of marriages that survive post-1996 may not be
comparable to the pre-1996 ones, as the "worst marriages" may drop out of our selected
sample upon divorce introduction, particularly for the non-religious. To deal with this
issue, we have replicated our estimations while excluding all women that are observed
getting separated or divorced at any point during the survey that is, they are no longer
in both our pre- and post-divorce samples. This excludes only 121 observations so that
the results with the remaining "stable marriages" are not fundamentally di¤erent from the
17We have checked that the mean of each covariate in X, as well as the mean propensity score, is
approximately equal across the treatment and control groups once these weights are used.
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baseline estimates. In any case, this does not solve the problem of non-random attrition
due to couples who disappear from the original dataset following a separation/divorce.
A traditional way to deal with these issues is to estimate a xed e¤ects model using
the panel information in the LII data. The new model is written as follows:
yit = i + t + Postit  Treati + Zit + Postit  Zit + it (2)
with Zit a vector of time-varying control variables, i the individual xed e¤ect and "it
an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term accounting for possible measurement error.
As before, the coe¢ cient  captures the potential e¤ect of the increased risk of marital
dissolution on the outcome for the treated. The dummy Postit takes a value of 1 if
household i is observed in year t which is posterior to the introduction of divorce, and 0
otherwise. It is only introduced through interaction terms since the time trend is already
accounted for in t.
The selection problem would be solved if dropping those who separate/divorce post-
1996 is equivalent, for the labor supply estimation, to taking out a random subgroup; that
is, if the residual it is not correlated with the propensity to separate/divorce. We control
in a linear way for the observed characteristics that can a¤ect this propensity (e.g., birth
of a child), and the xed e¤ects i may well capture time-invariant unobservables that
are correlated with the divorce risk.18 A usual limit to this approach is that we ignore the
possibility that time-varying unobservables (negative shocks like unemployment) a¤ect
both womens participation and their risk of divorce. We also estimate the xed e¤ects
model where observations are reweighted by the inverse propensity score as explained
above. According to Smith and Todd (2005), combining these two methods is more robust
than traditional cross-section matching estimators, as it allows selection on observables
as well as time-invariant selection on unobservables.
In table 5, we compare the di¤erent models for work hours including zeros and for
treatment 1. Reassuringly, the treatment e¤ect is signicant for the di¤erent timing
scenarios and insignicant for the placebo check. The simple xed e¤ects model gives
much smaller estimates, between 35% and 45% of what we previously found using the
reweighted di¤erence-in-di¤erence model. Results are very stable when adding interaction
terms and/or reweighting (again with the exception of the rst timing scenario, which gives
slightly larger e¤ects). As before, standard errors increase when reweighting is used. In
18For instance, the age at the beginning of the relationship (or the age at marriage), which is known
to inuence strongly the chances of marital breakdown and which is unfortunately not available in the
data.
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terms of work hours, the treatment e¤ect is in the range 1:3  2 over the di¤erent models
and timing scenarios. Similar estimations for the participation decision (not reported)
give a participation e¤ect around 4 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase
of 10% compared to the pre-divorce situation, to be compared to 10 points and 25% with
the reweighted di¤erence-in-di¤erence model.
Alternative Treatment/Control Groups and Datasets
We have also checked that results are robust to the choice of the treatment variable.
For instance, using the xed-e¤ects model with Postit  Zi interactions, we nd that
for all the "post" scenarios, the coe¢ cient  is signicantly positive for treatments 2
and 3 as previously dened, but also for alternative binary variables of religiosity (wifes
attendance: more than once a week; both wife and husband attend once a week; both wife
and husband attend more than once a week; both wife and husband have a high degree of
condence in the church) and several continuous variables (wife and husbands additive
and multiplicative scores for church attendance; wifes condence in the church; wife and
husbands additive score for condence in the church).
A nal robustness check is carried out using an alternative measure of religiosity based
on donations to the church and drawn from the Household Budget Survey. Since the
treatment in the LII analysis is the degree of non-religiosity (or the direct risk of marital
breakdown), we compute the degree of non-religiosity in the HBS as either 1=exp(church
donation) or 1   (church donation), where church donation is expressed as a proportion
of disposable income. Since the HBS only overlaps with the LII survey in years 1994 and
1999, we replicate the results based on the LII for these two years only, in order to improve
the comparison. Results of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimations are described in table 6.
Both measures conrm that participation and work hours (incl. zeros) increased between
1994 and 1999 as a likely response to the increased risk of marital breakdown.
Results for Men and Childcare Time
While we expected the higher risk of divorce to increase married womens labor supply,
the expected e¤ect on mens is more ambiguous. Men may want to work less in order to
reduce expected maintenance payments, but they may want to work more in anticipation
of the costs of potential separation and divorce.
We proceed with similar estimations on the labor supply of married men. The main
ndings are reported in table 7 for treatment 1 (using husbands church attendance) and
work hours (including zeros). We nd very weak evidence of an increase in male labor
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supply when using the di¤erence-in-di¤erence model with propensity score reweighting or
the xed e¤ects model. Estimates of the treatment e¤ect are signicant for some, but not
all, of the timing scenarios with the PS-reweighted xed e¤ects model. Yet the magnitude
of the e¤ect varies extremely from one timing scenario to the other, and coe¢ cients are
also signicant (and of a similar or larger magnitude) in the placebo test, which casts
serious doubt that what we are capturing here is the real e¤ect of divorce laws on male
labor supply. Results are similar when using either husbands or wifes attendance to
the church. We conclude that the introduction of divorce did not increase married mens
labor supply.
Finally, we have checked that our main results do not change signicantly when fo-
cusing on families with children. For these, we have also used LII information on time
spent by married women and men on childcare. An issue is that the denition of this
variable has changed, from a discrete choice ("less than 2 hours per day", "two to four
hours", "more than an hour") in 1994 to the exact number of hours of childcare per week
from 1995 data onwards. Since it was di¢ cult to reconcile these two pieces of information
into a consistent variable, we have rerun our estimations using the second denition and
for the years 1995-2001 only, which reduced the number of observations prior to divorce
legalization. Therefore, results are probably less robust than for labor supply estimations.
We focus on households with children only. In these, the average childcare time by fathers
is 9:5 hours per week in 1995 and 10 hours in 2001 while it is respectively 63 and 58 hours
for mothers. The right panel of table 7 shows in fact that childcare time has not change
signicantly for men or women in response to divorce legalization.
6 Conclusion
This paper exploits the recent legalization of divorce in Ireland as a natural experiment to
analyze the e¤ect of an increase in the risk of marital breakdown on spousal labor supply.
Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, we show that the exogenous shock to the risk of
marital breakdown brought about by the reform is responsible for a signicant increase in
female labor supply. The e¤ect is found to be especially strong at the extensive margin.
In other words, it seems that the increased risk of divorce led women to acquire insurance
against the potential negative shock of divorce by participating more in the labor market.
We have shown that labor supply increased signicantly also for the sub-group of
women with children. It is tempting to go one step further and to suggest that divorce
reduces specialization in marriage by accelerating the decline of traditional gender roles.
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However, additional evidence shows that time spent on childcare by men has not signif-
icantly increased while childrearing by women has not signicantly decreased. Further
research is needed to check if this conclusion extends to other domains within the sphere
of domestic production. In other words, it is possible that domestic activities performed
by wives, and hence the production of public goods within the household, have declined.
It may also be the case that married women with children have seen an increase in their
total working time (domestic and market work) with the reform, i.e., a decrease in pure
leisure, and a possible loss in welfare. This would be partly compensated if men undertook
more of the other domestic tasks or if women were compensated by a larger consump-
tion share (see Browning and Gørtz, 2006, for direct evidence on individual expenditure,
domestic and market work). It is unclear, however, whether legalizing divorce may have
strengthened or weakened wivesbargaining position within the marriage.19 Further re-
search could possibly evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the reforms by using the subjective
well-being information contained in the Living in Ireland Survey. In particular, it would
be possible to follow Alessie et al. (2006) to recover the sharing rule consistent with
spousesindividual welfare measures and check if the rule changed around the time of the
reform.
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Table 1: Probability of Marital Breakdown: Estimates
Coef. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Coef. Std. Err. Marg. Eff.
Age 0.13 0.04 *** .008 0.13 0.03 *** 0.008
Age2 / 1000 -1.45 0.38 *** -.084 -1.43 0.38 *** -0.083
Young chidren -0.17 0.10 * -.009 -0.18 0.10 * -0.009
No. of children < 18 -0.11 0.04 *** -.006 -0.11 0.04 *** -0.006
Urban 0.38 0.10 *** .022 0.38 0.10 *** 0.022
Religiosity (church attendance)
binary:
at least once a week -0.54 0.08 *** -.042
detailed categories:§
once a week -0.07 0.09 -0.004
>= once a month 0.30 0.12 ** 0.022
>= twice a year 0.42 0.14 *** 0.035
>= once a year 0.64 0.14 *** 0.066
once a year 0.68 0.18 *** 0.074
never 0.74 0.15 *** 0.081
Education §§
Some 2nd level, no exams -0.15 0.13 -.008 -0.15 0.13 -0.008
Group, Inter. and Junior Cert. -0.01 0.11 -.001 -0.01 0.11 -0.001
Leaving Cert./Matric -0.27 0.12 ** -.014 -0.25 0.12 ** -0.013
Diploma from University -0.35 0.17 ** -.015 -0.34 0.17 ** -0.015
Primary Degree -0.32 0.20 -.014 -0.33 0.20 * -0.014
Higher degree -0.31 0.21 -.014 -0.32 0.22 -0.014
Constant -3.48 0.78 *** -3.93 0.80 ***
No. obs
Pseudo-R2
§ Omitted variable: >once a week
§§ Omitted variable: no or primary educ.
Controls also include regions. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
0.173
15,682
0.181
15,682
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Married Women
Pre-divorce legalization
Post
pre # post pre post pre # post pre post pre ## post pre post
Age 42.8 44.8 38.1 41.3 42.5 45.3 38.0 42.3 41.4 42.2 36.9 38.2
Hours (incl. zeros) 11.7 12.6 13.9 16.4 11.7 12.6 13.9 15.5 9.0 12.9 10.6 15.1
Participation rate (%) 0.35 0.41 0.40 0.51 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.53
Increase in participation 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17
Crude diff-in-diff 0.05 0.02 0.03
# of Children <18 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.7
Pre School Child (%) 0.21 0.16 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.32 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.43 0.36
Urban (%) 0.44 0.41 0.70 0.68 0.45 0.40 0.71 0.68 0.55 0.38 0.73 0.64
Primary educ. (%) 16.7 13.8 16.8 15.7 16.9 12.7 16.8 18.3 20.1 12.0 24.8 13.0
Lower sec. educ (%) 37.9 36.9 36.4 36.9 38.2 35.9 35.4 38.4 31.7 30.1 31.3 30.3
High sec. educ (%) 34.1 36.3 30.6 29.6 33.6 36.9 30.7 27.8 41.3 45.8 34.8 41.4
University degree (%) 11.2 13.1 16.2 17.9 11.2 14.6 17.1 15.6 6.9 12.1 9.1 15.4
N 2,420 4,757 764 1,876 1,264 597 381 263 2171 1936 1324 1339
* Wife attends church at least once a week
** Household gives some positive donation to the church
Household Budget Surveys
Religious** Non religiousReligious* Non religious Religious* Non religious
Living in Ireland Surveys
1994
1999
1994 & 1995 until 25/11
1996 - 2001
1994
1999
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Table 3: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimates: Female labor Supply
Treatment: 1# 1 2 3 1 2 3
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 .07 *** .37 *** .20 *** 4.54 *** .09 *** .05 *** 1.09 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 .08 *** .41 *** .21 *** 4.62 *** .10 *** .05 *** 1.10 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 .08 *** .41 *** .21 *** 4.30 *** .10 *** .05 *** 1.03 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ .08 *** .41 *** .22 *** 4.95 *** .10 *** .05 *** 1.16 ***
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .00 .02 .01 -1.22 .00 .00 -.29
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ .05 .20 .11 1.60 .05 .03 .40
Range of R2 for the difference models:
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 2.62 *** 1.39 *** 25.19 *** .35 -.10 8.27
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 2.26 ** 1.15 ** 25.01 *** -1.25 -.71 3.26
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 2.23 ** 1.11 ** 25.51 *** -1.47 -.90 * 6.30
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ 2.39 ** 1.34 *** 26.21 *** -.85 -.36 .83
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .63 .39 -2.64 1.59 .98 10.55
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ .98 .55 4.75 -1.37 -.97 -12.98
Range of R2 for the difference models:
Treatment:
1: religiosity dummy =1 if wife's church attendance is high (at least once a week)
2: continuous religiosity variable based on wife's church attendance
3: continuous risk of marital breakdown
(10.37)
(11.09)
(11.50)
(1.33) (0.74)
(0.51)
(1.20) (0.67)
(0.92)
0.06 to 0.08
(0.95) (6.03) (1.02) (0.59)(0.51)
(1.18) (10.53)(0.61) (7.82)
Participation (coefficient)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.03) (0.02)
(0.09) (1.13)
(0.29)
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.27)
(0.03) (0.02) (0.26)
(0.04) (0.02) (0.28)
Participation (marginal effect)
(1.14)(0.06)(0.12)
0.14 to 0.18
(0.13) (0.07) (1.13)
(0.12) (0.06) (1.11)
(0.12) (0.07) (1.10)
(0.12) (0.06) (1.22)
Standard erros in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. The participation model is estimated by logit, except first column indicated
by # with coefficients from a linear probability model
(0.92) (0.52) (10.45)
Work hours (excl. zeros)
(1.00) (0.55) (10.22)
(0.89) (0.46) (5.92)
(5.97)(0.90) (0.47)
Work hours (incl. zeros)
(0.91) (0.47) (5.96)
(0.94) (0.50) (6.84)
0.15 to 0.17
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
(0.16)
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Table 4: D-in-D Estimates with Propensity Score Reweighting: Female labor Supply
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 .37 *** .45 *** .44 *** 2.62 *** 3.88 *** 3.84 ***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.91) (1.23) (1.21)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 .41 *** .45 *** .45 *** 2.26 ** 2.99 *** 2.93 ***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.89) (1.15) (1.14)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 .41 *** .48 *** .48 *** 2.23 ** 3.00 *** 2.97 ***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.90) (1.15) (1.15)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ .41 *** .46 *** .46 *** 2.39 ** 3.25 *** 3.20 ***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.95) (1.26) (1.23)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .02 .19 .18 .63 .14 .11
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.94) (1.44) (1.45)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ .20 .27 .25 .98 1.11 1.08
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (1.18) (1.47) (1.45)
Treatment = 1 if wife's church attendance is high (at least once a week)
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
Reweighted Reweighted &interactions
Standard erros in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
Participation
Post x controls
interactions
Hours (incl. zeros)
Post x controls
interactions Reweighted
Reweighted &
interactions
Table 5: Fixed-e¤ects Estimates: Female Work Hours (incl. zeros)
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 3.84 *** 1.35 *** 1.44 *** 1.90 *** 1.97 ***
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 2.93 *** 1.30 *** 1.35 *** 1.33 ** 1.38 **
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 2.97 *** 1.33 *** 1.42 *** 1.31 * 1.40 **
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ 3.20 *** 1.34 *** 1.39 *** 1.36 ** 1.41 **
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 .11 .94 1.07 .67 .61
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ 1.08 1.04 1.19 1.36 1.41
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
(0.64)
(0.70)
FE
(1.45)
DD, reweighted
& interactions
(1.21)
(1.14)
(1.15)
(1.23)
(0.41)
(0.43)
(1.45)
(0.42) (0.57) (0.58)
FE, reweighted FE, reweighted& interactionsFE, interactions
(0.46) (0.64) (0.65)
(0.47)
(0.45)
(0.64)
(0.48) (0.67) (0.69)
(0.44) (0.63)
(0.66)
(0.72)
(0.83) (0.86)
(0.88) (0.91)
Std. errors in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. DD: difference in difference on pooled data. FE: fixed-effects
estimations. Treatment = 1 if wife's church attendance is high (at least once a week).
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Table 6: Comparison: Household Budget Survey and Living in Ireland Survey
Participation 10.75 * 2.47 * .18 *
(5.49) (1.35) (0.09)
Hours (incl. zeros) 75.54 ** 17.07 ** 1.07 **
(33.02) (7.99) (0.54)
Hours (excl. zeros) 40.54 11.14 .27
(52.31) (12.70) (0.84)
A: 1 / exp(relative church donation)
B: 1 - (relative church donation)
C: wife's church attendance (scale 1-7, with 1 = very religious)
Note: in HBS, relative donation expressed in % of disposable income
(hence measures A and B are in a [0-1] range, with 0= very religious)
Pre: year 1994, Post: year 1999. Std. errors in brackets.  Level of significance:
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. Treatment (continuous var. for non- religiosity):
CBA
Margin \ Treatment (Data)
(HBS) (HBS) (LII)
Table 7: Additional Results
Pre Post
1994 - 24/11/1995 24/11/1995 - 2001 1.62 .40 .92 1.54 -.03
(1.12) (0.49) (0.57) (1.99) (0.78)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 2.03 * .97 * 1.36 ** .81 -.41
(1.04) (0.52) (0.58) (2.03) (0.90)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1998 - 2001 2.14 ** .86 1.30 ** .66 -1.53
(1.06) (0.57) (0.60) (2.21) (0.94)
1994 - 24/11/1995 1997 - 2001 @ 1.62 .83 1.28 ** 1.00 -.46
(1.10) (0.55) (0.60) (2.06) (0.91)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 2.40 * 2.27 *** 1.95 ** 2.80 .33
(1.29) (0.74) (0.82) (2.81) (1.99)
1998 - 99 2000 - 2001 @ 1.87 2.07 ** 1.74 * 1.00 -.46
(1.40) (0.83) (0.90) (2.95) (2.17)
@ excluding the refreshment sample for 2000-2001
Men's Hours (incl. zeros)
DD, reweighting
& interaction FE, interaction
Std. errors in brackets. Level of significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. DD: difference in difference on pooled data. FE: fixed-effects
estimations. Treatment = 1 if church attendance is high (at least once a week). # = estimation on households with children only.
Weekly childcare # (FE,
reweighting & interaction)
Women MenFE, reweighting& interaction
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